Israeli military operations against Gaza: Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014) by Henderson, Christian
	 1	
Israeli military operations against Gaza: Operation Cast Lead (2008-9), 
Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge 
(2014) 
 
Christian Henderson* 
 
in  
T. Ruys, O. Corten and A. Hofer (eds), The Use of Force in International Law: A 
Case-Based Approach (Oxford University Press, 2018) 
 
 
I. Facts and context 
 
Between 2008 and 2014 Israel launched three major operations inside the Gaza Strip: Operation 
Cast Lead (2008-9), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). 
These were all launched in response to rockets launched from Gaza by Hamas and other militia 
groups operating from within the Gaza Strip. While oversimplification of the complexity of the 
situation between Israel and Gaza is inevitable, some general background context is necessary in 
understanding the Israeli military interventions.1  
 
Israel became the belligerent occupant of Gaza in 1967 after the conclusion of the Six Day War. 
After negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization at Camp David in 
July 2000 ended in deadlock, the second intifada began on 28 September 2000. In September 
2005, Israel implemented a disengagement plan, which was intended to end the occupation, in 
which it evacuated Israeli settlers within Gaza, withdrew its troops, and ended internal control 
within the territory, although it retained control over much of Gaza’s external existence.2 
However, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have conducted numerous military operations within 
Gaza,3 including Operation Summer Rains on 28 June 2006 which followed the capture by 
Hamas of IDF Corporal Gilad Shalit.4 This operation had the aim of both securing the release of 
Corporal Shalit and the suppression of rockets fired from Gaza into southern Israel. However, 
rocket fire increased following Hamas’ forcible assumption of control of Gaza in June 2007,5 
and Israel’s subsequent declaration that Gaza was to be considered hostile territory.6  
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1 Iain Scobbie, ‘Gaza’ in Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford 
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2 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel’s Disengagement Plan: Selected Documents’ available at 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israeli%20disengagement%20plan%2020-jan-
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3 ‘Israeli military operations against Gaza, 2000-2008’ (2009) 38 Journal of Palestine Studies 122. 
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5 ‘Hamas takes full control of Gaza’ BBC News (15 June 2007) available at 
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6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Behind the headlines: Israel designates Gaza a “hostile territory”’ (24 
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On 18 June 2008, an Egyptian brokered ceasefire came into effect, whereby Israel would cease 
its incursions into and ease its blockade of Gaza, while Hamas would cease the missile and 
mortar attacks into Israel.7 While violations of the ceasefire occurred, it was reasonably well 
respected during its early stages.8 Nonetheless, following a progressive breakdown of the 
ceasefire, Israel launched an offensive into Gaza on 4 November 20089 and closed the crossings 
into Gaza the following day.10 This led to a hostile reaction from those operating within Gaza, 
which included Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the 
Islamic Jihad, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades (the military wing of the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine), and al- Naser Salah ad-Din Brigades (the military wing of the Popular 
Resistance Committees).11 The number of rockets fired into Israeli territory consequently 
increased.12 Subsequently, on 27 December 2008, Israel launched a major military offensive in 
the Gaza Strip codenamed Operation Cast Lead.13 This began as a land and sea operation with a 
ground invasion commencing on 3 January 2009.  
 
Over the course of the operation between 2,300 and 3,000 sorties were flown.14 Approximately 
1,400 Palestinians were killed, the vast majority of whom were civilians,15 and thirteen Israelis 
were killed, of whom 10 were soldiers and three were civilians.16 The aerial bombardment 
inflicted severe damage on Gaza’s infrastructure in that 2,400 homes, 29 Schools, 121 
commercial and industrial workshops, 60 police stations, and 30 mosques were reportedly 
damaged or destroyed.17  
 
The UN Security Council met in private on 28 December 2008 and issued a press statement in 
which it ‘called for an immediate halt to all violence’ and for the opening of border crossings,18 
which was not adhered to. The Council met a further two times, on 31 December 2008 and 6/7 
January 2009,19 before adopting UN Security Council Resolution 1860 on 8 January 2009 which 
called ‘for an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of 
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Israeli forces from Gaza’.20 The UN General Assembly met for an Emergency Special Session 
on 15 and 16 January 200921 and adopted a resolution which similarly supported an immediate 
ceasefire in Gaza.22 However, the operation, which lasted a total of twenty-two days, only came 
to an eventual end on 18 January 2009.23 After the escalation had come to an end/Thereafter, 
Hamas and Israel observed an informal cease-fire,24 although rocket fire from Gaza did not 
completely cease and Israel continued to conduct minor raids into Gaza.  
 
Subsequently, on 14 November 2012, and following further skirmishes between groups within 
Gaza and the IDF, Israel launched another major operation, this time codenamed Operation Pillar 
of Defense.25 The operation, which lasted eight days, began with the killing of Ahmed al-Jabari, 
the chief of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.26 Israel claimed that the operation had been 
launched following the firing of 100 rockets from Gaza within a 24-hour period,27 and in 
response to an attack by Gaza militants on an Israeli military patrol jeep within Israeli territory 
and an explosion near Israeli soldiers who were positioned on the Israeli side of a tunnel passing 
under the Israeli West Bank barrier.28 During the course of Operation Pillar of Defense, the IDF 
claimed to have struck 1450 sites within Gaza, including rocket stores and launch pads, 
suspected Hamas command posts, government facilities, and apartment blocks,29 while over 
1,400 rockets were fired into Israeli territory, with Tel-Aviv being hit for the first time since the 
1991 Gulf War, and with rockets also being fired at Jerusalem.30 Furthermore, over 400 rockets 
were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile defense system,31 while 142 fell within the 
Gaza Strip itself.32 By the end of the operation six Israelis had been killed and 239 injured while 
174 Palestinians had been killed and hundreds wounded.33 Following days of negotiation 
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November 2012) available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/14/israel-assassinates-hamas-military-
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27 ‘Gaza groups pound Israel with over 100 rockets’ The Jerusalem Post (12 November 2012) available at 
<http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Gaza-groups-pound-Israel-with-over-100-rockets>. 
28 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pillar of Defense – Statement by DM Ehud Barak’ (14 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2012/Pages/Pillar_of_Defense-Statement_DM_Barak_14-
Nov-2012.aspx>. 
29 Verbatim Record (21 November 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6869, 2 (Secretary-General) (Statement by the UN 
Secretary-General); ‘Factbox: Gaza targets bombed by Hamas’ Reuters (21 November 2012) available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-gaza-idUSBRE8AK0H920121121>.  
30 Statement by the UN Secretary-General, ibid. See also ‘Gaza terrorists fire two rockets at Tel Aviv’The Jerusalem 
Post (16 November 2012) available at http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Gaza-terrorists-fire-two-rockets-at-Tel-Aviv.  
31 Statement by the UN Secretary-General (n 29) 3. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the implementation of Human Rights 
Council resolutions S-9/1 and S-12/1(6 March 2013) UN Doc. A/HRC/22/35/Add.1, [6], available at 
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between Hamas and Israel a ceasefire, again mediated by Egypt, was announced on 21 
November 2012.34 
 
After several years of relative quiet, on 12 June 2014 three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and 
murdered by two members of Hamas.35 Their bodies were discovered shortly after on 30 June.36 
Israel submitted a letter to the UN Security Council claiming that it held ‘Hamas terrorists’ 
responsible for the deaths of the three teenagers.37 At the same time it made a complaint about 
the number of rockets that had been fired into Israel during the preceding weeks and asserted that 
‘[t]he Israeli government has a right and a duty to protect its citizens’.38 Shortly afterwards the 
Israeli air force launched a series of air raids on the Gaza Strip, codenamed operation Brother’s 
Keeper.39  
 
Far from dampening the number of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel they instead increased 
and, on 8 July 2014, Israel launched a major military air offensive into Gaza codenamed 
Operation Protective Edge.40 On 17 July the operation was expanded by the launching of a 
ground invasion with the stated aim of degrading the ‘terror organisations’ military 
infrastructure, and [… neutralize] their network of cross-border assault tunnels’.41 During this 
seven-week operation, over 2,200 Palestinians were killed and 11,000 were injured, most of 
whom were civilians.42 Sixty-seven Israeli IDF soldiers and six civilians in Israel were reportedly 
killed during the course of the operation, while 1,600 soldiers and a few dozen civilians were 
injured.43 It was said that approximately 16,800 housing units were destroyed or severely 
damaged.44 At the height of the hostilities, the number of internally displaced persons in Gaza 
reached 500,000, or 28 per cent of the population.45 It was reported that Hamas, Islamic Jihad 
and other militant groups had fired over 4,800 rockets and 1,700 mortars from Gaza into Israel,46 
																																																																																																																																																																														
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.35.Add.1_AV.pdf>
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34 Peter Beaumont, Harriet Sherwood, and Ian Black, ‘Gaza ceasefire announced in Cairo’ The Guardian (21 
November 2012) available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/21/gaza-ceasefire-announced-cairo>. 
35 Report of the independent commission of inquiry established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-
21/1, (24 June 2015) UN Doc. A/HRC/29/52  [18], available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIGazaConflict/Pages/ReportCoIGaza.aspx>. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Identical letters dated 30 June from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (30 June 2014) UN Doc S/2014/454. 
38 Ibid. 
39 ‘Israel Bombs Gaza after Settler Found Killed’ Al Jazeera (1 July 2014) available at 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/israel-bombs-gaza-after-settler-bodies-found-
20147171631852351.html>. 
40 Report of the independent commission of inquiry (n 35) [19]; ‘Israel “ready for escalation” of Gaza conflict’ BBC 
News (8 July 2014) available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28206556>. 
41 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects’ (14 June 2015) [77], 
available at <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/IsraelGaza2014/Pages/2014-Gaza-Conflict-Factual-and-Legal-
Aspects.aspx>; ‘Israel starts Gaza ground offensive’ BBC News (18 July 2014) available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28359582>. 
42 Report of the independent commission of inquiry (n 35) [20]. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. [23]. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. [27]. 
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while the IDF carried out more than 6,000 air strikes in Gaza.47 
 
The UN Security Council met three times during the course of the operation, on 10 July, at 
which only the UN Secretary General and the representatives of Israel and Palestine spoke,48 and 
then again on 18 and 22 July.49  On 28 July, the Security Council adopted a Presidential 
Statement, calling for a de-escalation, restoration of the 2012 ceasefire, respect for international 
law and a resumption of direct negotiations between both the parties.50 A few humanitarian 
truces were observed to allow in humanitarian aid.51 Israeli ground forces ultimately withdrew on 
5 August 2014,52 and on 26 August an open-ended ceasefire was announced,53 which, despite a 
few isolated incidents involving rockets from Gaza,54 held up throughout the final months of 
2014. 
II. The positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of third States and 
international organisations 
 
1. Operation Cast Lead 
 
On the morning of the launching of Operation Cast Lead, Gabriela Shalev, Israel’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, sent identical letters to the UN Security Council and UN 
Secretary-General announcing that ‘after a long period of utmost restraint, the Government of 
Israel has decided to exercise, as of this morning, its right to self-defense’.55 In addition, the 
																																																						
47 ‘The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects’ (n 41)  [272]; Report of the independent commission of 
inquiry (n 35) [35]. 
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49 UNSC Verbatim Record (18 July 2014) UN Doc S/PV.7220; UNSC Verbatim Record (22 July 2014) UN Doc 
S/PV.7222 
50 Statement by the President of the Security Council(28 July 2014) UN Doc S/PRST/2014/13. 
51 ‘Israel and Hamas to observe brief Gaza truce’ Al Jazeera (17 July 2014) 
<www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/israel-temporarily-halt-fire-gaza-strip-201471620212427540.html>; 
‘Shortlived truce broken in Gaza’s Shujayea’ Al Jazeera (20 July 2014) 
<www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/ceasefire-under-way-gaza-201472010432898980.html>; ’12-hour 
truce comes into force in Gaza’ Al Jazeera (26 July 2014) <www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/reports-
hamas-israel-agree-12-hour-truce-201472522159800712.html>; ‘Hamas and Israel agree 72-hour Gaza ceasefire’ Al 
Jazeera (1 August 2014) <www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/un-us-announce-72-hour-gaza-ceasefire-
2014731214037997737.html>; Nidal Al-Mughrabi, ‘Palestinians accuse Israel of violating Gaza truce’ Reuters (15 
August 2014) <www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/15/us-mideast-gaza-shots-idUSKBN0GF1DE20140815>. 
52 ‘Israel pulls troops out of Gaza’ BBC News (5 August 2014) available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-28654229>. 
53 Report of the independent commission of inquiry (n 30) [19]; ‘What’s in the Gaza peace deal?’ Reuters (26 
August 2014) available at <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-gaza-ceasefire-details-
idUSKBN0GQ1XQ20140826> ; Harriet Sherwood and Hazem Balousha, ‘Gaza ceasefire: Israel and Palestinians 
agree to halt weeks of fighting’ The Guardian (27 August 2014) available at 
<www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/gaza-ceasefire-israel-palestinians-halt-fighting>. 
54 Stuart Winer, ‘Mortar shell fired from Gaza at Israel’ Times of Israel (16 September 2014) 
<www.timesofisrael.com/rocket-or-mortar-shell-fired-from-gaza-at-israel/>; ‘Gaza rocket hits southern Israel 
causing no damage or injuries: army’ Reuters (1 November 2014) <www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/01/us-
mideast-israel-gaza-idUSKBN0IL2OY20141101>.  
55 Identical letters dated 27 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (27 December 2008) UN Doc. 
S/2008/816. The Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, stated in an address to the Israeli Knesset on 29 December 
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letter stated that Israel had ‘decided to actively fight terrorism and protect its citizens from 
further terrorist attacks’ by responding to the rockets fired from Hamas in the Gaza Strip into 
Southern Israel ‘in accordance with the inherent right of every State to self-defense as enshrined 
in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’.56 Israel’s response, the letter stated, was 
‘aimed solely against the terrorists and their infrastructure in the Gaza Strip’ and ‘not … at the 
civilian population’, and that ‘Israel will continue to provide the people of Gaza with their basic 
humanitarian needs.’57 At a UN Security Council meeting on 31 December 2008, Ambassador 
Shalev again stated that in light of ‘a steep escalation in Hamas attacks against Israel’ and to 
‘send a clear message to the Hamas terrorists’ that ‘enough is enough’58 Israel ‘ha[d] exercised 
its inherent right to self-defence, which is enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter’.59  
 
While not expressly mentioning the right of self-defence at the UN Security Council meeting on 
6 January 2009, Ambassador Shalev added some context to Israel’s invocation of this right. In 
claiming that Israel had ‘sought every way to avoid the current conflict’60 and in light of the 
upsurge in rocket attacks ‘it could not restrain [itself] any longer’.61 Interestingly, and in 
justifying some of its targeting decisions during the conflict, it was added that: 
 
 The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have dropped tens of thousands of leaflets and made thousands of phone 
calls to Palestinian civilians, beseeching them to leave the areas of terrorist operation to avoid harm. But let 
this be clear: failing to respond to terrorists simply because they are using civilians as cover is not and cannot 
be an option. To do so would simply broadcast an invitation to every terrorist group in the world to set up 
shop inside a hospital or a kindergarten.62 
 
In defending the magnitude of the operation the Israeli Ambassador also noted that: 
 
This is not about a “ceasefire” with terrorism or a mutual cessation of hostilities. It is about ensuring the end 
of terrorism from Gaza and the end of smuggling weapons into Gaza, so that there is no longer a need for 
Israeli defensive operations.63 
 
Operation Cast Lead, unsurprisingly, was the subject of a significant amount of international 
controversy. Several States appeared to accept Israel’s claim to be acting in self-defence. Outside 
of the UN Security Council, US President George W. Bush stated that ‘Israel has a right to 
																																																																																																																																																																														
2008 that ‘Israel is entitled to defend itself against any attempt to harm its sovereignty, the well-being of its residents 
and the security of its citizens. Israel’s actions fulfill its basic right to self-defence.’ See Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, ‘Address to the Knesset by FM Livni on Gaza Operation’ (29 December 2008) available at 
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Address_Knesset_FM_Livni_Gaza_operation_29-Dec-2008.aspx>. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., and Identical letters dated 6 January 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the Secretary-
General and President of the Security Council (6 January 2009) UN Doc. S/2009/6. 
58 UN Doc S/PV.6060 (n 19) 6. Although it was also stated that Israel had been ‘subjected to deliberate terrorist 
attacks carried out by Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist organizations operating from the Gaza Strip’ at 6. 
59 Ibid. It was also noted that ‘[p]rotecting the lives and well-being of one’s citizens is not only a right, but also a 
responsibility of every sovereign State’. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 7. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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defend herself’,64 and, on the fourteenth day of the offensive, the US House of Representatives 
recognized ‘[Israel’s] right to act in self-defense to protect its citizens against Hamas’s unceasing 
aggression, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.’65 Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin 
Rudd, similarly stated that ‘Australia recognizes Israel’s right to self-defence’.66 
 
The two UN Security Council meetings on 31 December 200867 and 6 January 200968 were 
attended by the Permanent Observer to Palestine, Riyad Mansour, and the President of the 
Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, respectively. During the course of their 
speeches at these meetings both spoke of Israel’s ‘aggression’ in Gaza,69 of Israel as the 
occupying power,70 of the acts constituting collective punishment of the Palestinian people,71 and 
of the need for an immediate ceasefire.72 Mr Mansour spoke of Israel’s ‘brute force – excessive 
force – against the population’ of Gaza.73 Much was told of the suffering on the ground by those 
living within Gaza,74 but there was little mention of, let alone justification for, the rockets 
emanating from Gaza, and no mention of Hamas.75 Hamas itself did not appear to issue a 
justification for the rockets fired. 
 
At the meeting on 31 December 2008, virtually all States expressed concern at the situation and 
called for a ceasefire,76 with some States condemning the inaction of the UN Security Council.77 
The US was the only State to hold Hamas solely responsible for the violence,78 while many other 
States took a more balanced view in condemning both the rocket attacks and Israel’s response to 
them.79 Several States were fiercely critical of Israel’s actions,80 describing them as 
‘aggression’81 by an occupying power.82 Others denied that the actions were taken in self-
defence,83 with some describing them as ‘collective punishment’ of the people of Gaza.84 
However, although many States speaking in the Council recognized Israel’s right of self-defence, 
while urging caution,85 most deemed the intervention as disproportionate.86 
																																																						
64 ‘President Bush’s Final News Conference’ NY Times (12 January 2009) available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/12/us/politics/12text-bush.html?pagewanted=all>. 
65 H.R. Con. Res. 34, 111th Cong. (2009). 
66 ‘Rudd defends Israel’s Rights’ The Australian (6 January 2009) available at <https://www.pressreader.com>. 
67 S/PV.6060 (n 19). 
68 UN Doc. S/PV.6061 (n 19).  
69 S/PV.6060 (n 19), 4-5; S/PV.6061, ibid., 4-6. 
70 S/PV.6060, ibid., 4-5; S/PV.6061, ibid., 4-6. 
71 S/PV.6060, ibid., 4-5; S/PV.6061, ibid., 4-6. 
72 S/PV.6060, ibid., 4-5; S/PV.6061, ibid., 4-6. 
73 S/PV.6060, ibid., 5. 
74 S/PV.6060, ibid., 4-5; S/PV.6061 ibid 4-6. 
75 Something noted by the Israeli ambassador: S/PV.6060, ibid., 6. 
76 S/PV.6060 (n 19). 
77  Ibid 18 (Egypt), 19 (League of Arab States) 
78 Ibid 14 (US) 
79  Ibid 9 (France), 11 (Russia), 15 (Bukina Faso), 17 (Belgium) 
80  Ibid 8 (Libya), 9 (South Africa), 10 (Indonesia) 
81 Ibid 18 Egypt, 19 (League of Arab States) 
82  Ibid 18 (Egypt) 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 10 (Indonesia), 13 (Vietnam), 19 (League of Arab States) 
85  Ibid 9 (South Africa), 13 (Italy), 13 (Vietnam), 16 (Costa Rica), 17 (Belgium) 
86  Ibid 8 (Libya), 9 (South Africa), 9 (France), 10 (Indonesia), 13 (Vietnam), 15 (Burkina Faso), 16 (Costa Rica), 17 
(Belgium), 18 (Egypt) 
	 8	
 
A similar picture emerged at the meeting on 6/7 January 2009 where most States spoke at this 
meeting, again, expressed concern and called for a ceasefire.87 However, many more States 
spoke and, unsurprisingly, given the time that had passed since the previous meeting of the 
Council which had discussed the issue, there was noticeably more criticism of Israel,88 with 
claims of disproportionality89 being prominent. Again, several States characterized Israel’s 
actions as aggression,90 with one State noting that the ‘actions clearly demonstrate Israel’s 
complete disregard for international law and its violation of the United Nations Charter’.91 
Claims that Israel was in occupation of Gaza92 were made and also that it was acting in collective 
punishment of the people of Gaza.93 Several States, again, took a balanced approach in 
condemning both the rocket attacks and Israel’s response,94 and, again, some, while recognizing 
Israel’s right of self-defence, nonetheless urged caution.95 While inaction by the UN Security 
Council was again condemned,96 some States went further in raising the prospect of action by the 
UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace resolution.97 A similar range of views was 
expressed during the parallel debates within the UN General Assembly.98 
 
There was also condemnation of Israel outside of the meetings of the UN. On the day the 
intervention was launched, Jordan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Khalid 
Shawabkah, condemned the action taken by Israel as ‘unjustified aggression’.99 Similarly, on 14 
January 2009, the Malaysian Parliament adopted a resolution in which it called on ‘the United 
Nations General Assembly to immediately? establish an International Criminal Tribunal for 
Palestine to investigate and prosecute suspected Israeli war criminals involved in the brutal and 
																																																						
87 UN Doc. S/PV.6061 (n 19). 
88), Ibid 10 (Turkey), 12 (Libya) 14 (Austria); UN Doc. S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 8-9 (Indonesia), 9 
(Pakistan), 14 (Nicaragua), 15 (Venezuela), 17 (Bolivia). 
89 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 10 (Turkey), 14 (Austria), 15 (Vietnam), 19 (Mexico); UN Doc S/PV.6061 
(Resumption 1) 2 (Malaysia), 5 (Brazil), 8 (Argentina), 9 (Pakistan), 15 (Iceland), 16 (Ecuador), 17 (Bolivia), 17 
(Paraguay, on behalf of the States members of the Common Market of the South)   
90 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 12 (Libya), 22 (Saudi Arabia), 24 (League of Arab States), 28 (Egypt), 29 (Jordan), 31 
(Lebanon), 31 (Morocco), 33 (Qatar); UN Doc S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 2 (Malaysia), 4 (Cuba, on behalf 
of the Non-Aligned Movement), 10 (Pakistan), 12 (Iran), 14 (Nicaragua), 17 (Bolivia) 
91 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 2 Malaysia 
92 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 13 (Libya), 24 (League of Arab States), 28 (Egypt), 31 (Lebanon), 33 (Qatar); UN Doc 
S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 10 (Pakistan), 12 (Iran), 13 (Nicaragua), 16 (Ecuador) 
93(4 (resumption 1)), UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 23 (Saudi Arabia), 29 (Jordan), 31 (Lebanon); UN Doc S/PV.6061 
(Resumption 1) (n 19) 4 (Cuba, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement) 
94 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 14 (Austria), 19 (Mexico); UN Doc S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 5 (Brazil), 8 
(Argentina), 15 (Iceland), 17 (Paraguay, on behalf of the States members of the Common Market of the South). 
95) UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 14 (Austria), 18 (Croatia), 19 (Japan) 21 (Uganda) 
96  UN Doc S/PV.6061 (n 19) 34 (Qatar); UN Doc S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 2 (Malaysia), 10 (Pakistan), 13 
(Iran), 14 (Nicaragua), 17 (Ecuador), 18 (Paraguay, on behalf of the States members of the Common Market of the 
South) 
97 UN Doc S/PV.6061 (Resumption 1) (n 19) 9 (Indonesia), 13 (Iran), 17 (Ecuador). 
98 See Tenth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 32nd, 33rd, 34th and 35th meetings 
UN Doc A/ES-10/PV.32 to UN Doc A/ES-10/PV.36 (n 21) 
99 Identical letters dated 27 December 2008 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council (27 December 2008) 
UN Doc. S/2008/818. 
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aggressive acts on the Palestinian people.’100  
 
 
 
The Human Rights Council condemned Israel’s actions in Gaza as an act of aggression in calling 
upon ‘the international community to support the current initiative aiming at putting an 
immediate end to the current military aggression in Gaza’,101 and strongly condemned ‘the 
ongoing Israeli military operation carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, in particular 
in the Occupied Gaza Strip.’102 It decided to dispatch an urgent independent fact-finding mission 
to Gaza,103 led by Richard Goldstone, which issued a report on Operation Cast Lead on 3 April 
2009,104 although it omitted to cover the jus ad bellum aspects of the operation.105 
 
2. Operation Pillar of Defense 
 
Neither at the outset or during Operation Pillar of Defense did Israel submit a letter to the UN 
Security Council informing it that it had invoked its right of self-defence. Nonetheless, in a 
statement published on the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, it was asserted that Israel 
‘ha[d] the right under international law, and a moral obligation, to act in self-defense, to defend 
its population and to protect its territory when under attack, as well as to take military action 
against the terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip’.106 However, it also noted that ‘Hamas and other 
terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip have been waging an ongoing armed conflict against 
Israel’ and that Hamas had violated ‘the principle of distinction’ and that ‘Israel and the IDF are 
fully committed to international law in general, and to the Laws of Armed Conflict in 
particular’.107 A statement by the Israeli Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, stated that the aims of 
the operation were to  strengthen Israel’s deterrence, inflict serious damage on the rocket 
launching network, deliver a painful blow for Hamas and the other terrorist organizations, and 
minimize damage to Israel’s home front.108  
 
The European Union denounced the rocket attacks from Gaza and claimed that Israel ‘has the 
																																																						
100 Letter dated 14 January 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the General Assembly and the Annexed to the Letter dated 14 January 2009 from the Permanent 
Representative of Malaysia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (16 January 
2009) UN Doc. A/ES-10/444. 
101 UN Human Rights Council Resolution (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/S-9/L.1/Rev.2  [7]. 
102 Ibid.,[1]. 
103 Ibid.[14]. 
104 For the report of this mission see Goldstone Report (n 7). See, in general, Zeray Yihdego, ‘The Gaza Mission: 
Implications for International Humanitarian Law and UN Fact-Finding’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 1. 
105 This was considered by some as constituting a ‘blind spot’ of the Report. See John Reynolds, ‘The Use of Force 
in a Colonial Present, and the Goldstone Report’s Blind Spot’ (2010) 16 Palestine Yearbook of International Law 
55. 
106 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Operation Pillar of Defense: Legal Points’ (19 November 2012) available at 
<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Operation_Pillar_of_Defense_Legal_points.aspx>. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pillar of Defense: Statement by DM Ehud Barak’ (14 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2012/Pages/Pillar_of_Defense-Statement_DM_Barak_14-
Nov-2012.aspx>. 
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right to protect itself from these kinds of attacks’ but also that it ‘must act proportionately and 
ensure the protection of civilians at all times’.109 The President Obama condemned the rocket 
attacks from Gaza and stated that the United States was ‘fully supportive of Israel’s right to 
defend itself’.110 The United Kingdom Foreign Secretaryasserted that ‘Hamas bears principal 
responsibility for the current crisis’ and ‘utterly condemn[ed] [the] rocket attacks from Gaza into 
southern Israel by Hamas and other armed groups’.111 Similar support for what was deemed 
Israel’s right of self-defence and/or condemnation of Hamas came from several other Western 
States, including Australia112 and the Netherlands.113 France, Germany and Belgium, expressed 
concern over the escalating violence between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.114 While acknowledging 
Israel’s right to defend itself, a measured response was called for and all parties were urged to act 
wisely. Caution by both sides was also urged by many other States, including Russia,115 China,116 
and Ireland.117 
 
On the other hand, Fawzi Barhoum, a spokesman for Hamas, characterized the assassination of 
Ahmed Jabari as a declaration of war,118 while the Palestinian Authority, President Mahmoud 
Abbas, condemned the Israeli military operation and asked for an emergency meeting of the 
Arab League to discuss the Israeli ‘aggression’.119 At an emergency meeting, the Arab League 
denounced Israel’s operation in Gaza and issued a call to prosecute Israel for war crimes.120 The 
Non-Aligned Movement, of which Iran held the Presidency at the time, also issued a statement 
claiming that: ‘Israel, the occupying power, is, once more, escalating its military campaign 
against the Palestinian people, particularly in the Gaza Strip’ and condemned ‘this act of 
aggression by the Israelis and their resort to force against the defenseless people’ and demanded 
																																																						
109 Tovah Lazaroff, ‘EU: Israel has the right to proportional self-defense’ The Jerusalem Post (19 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/EU-Israel-has-right-to-proportional-self-defense>. 
110 The White House, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Shinawatra in a Joint Press Conference (18 
November 2012) available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/18/remarks-president-obama-
and-prime-minister-shinawatra-joint-press-confer>. See also US Department of State, ‘Gaza Rocket Attacks’ (14 
November 2012) available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200551.htm>. 
111 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Statement on Gaza and southern Israel’ (15 
November 2012) available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-statement-on-gaza-and-
southern-israel>. See also ‘Israel-Gaza crisis: Cameron speaks to Netanyahu’ BBC News (15 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-20338088>. 
112 Bianca Hall, ‘Gillard condemns attacks on Israel’ The Age (16 November 2012) available at 
<http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/gillard-condemns-attacks-on-israel-20121115-29fx8>. 
113 Government of the Netherlands, ‘Timmermans condemns rockets attacks on Israel from Gaza’ (13 November 
2012) available at <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2012/11/13/timmermans-condemns-rocket-attacks-on-
israel-from-gaza>. 
114 ‘EU ministers caution Israel over escalation in Gaza’ EurActiv.com (16 November 2012) available at 
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-ministers-caution-israel-over-escalation-in-gaza/>. 
115 ‘Russian FM calls for Israel-Hamas ceasefire following attacks on Gaza media center’ RT (19 November 2012) 
available at <https://www.rt.com/politics/gaza-rt-office-ministry-statement-037/>. 
116 ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs: China is gravely concerned about Israel's military action against Gaza’ China Daily 
(16 November 2012) available at <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzx/2012-11/16/content_15934878.htm>. 
117 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Ireland), ‘Tánaiste calls for end to Gaza violence’ (15 November 
2012) available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20121117173749/http://www.dfa.ie/home/index.aspx?id=88779>. 
118 ‘Hamas: Assassination is a Declaration of War’ The Jerusalem Post (14 November 2012)- available at 
<http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-Assassination-is-a-declaration-of-war>. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Elad Benari, ‘Arab Foreign Ministers Blame Israel for Gaza Violence’ Arutz Sheva (18 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/162181#.UKsISofO0gM>. 
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‘decisive action by the UN Security Council.’121 Many States specifically condemned Israel’s 
actions in Gaza, with assertions that they were aggressive and disproportionate, including 
Bahrain,122 Egypt,123 Jordan,124 Turkey,125 Russia,126 Pakistan,127 Saudi Arabia,128 and Yemen.129 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch urged both sides to cease violent acts.130 
 
The UN Security Council held a private emergency meeting on 14 November 2012 without 
reaching a decision.131 The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, went on a three-day visit to 
Egypt, Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories and Jordan and issued a statement to the UN 
Security Council on the day the ceasefire was announced,132 whereby he urged adherence to the 
ceasefire and expressed regret at the numbers of causalities.133 Furthermore, the Secretary-
General ‘consistently condemn[ed] indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza into Israel’ while at the 
same time believing ‘that the excessive and disproportionate use of force that endangers civilian 
lives is intolerable.’134 
 
3. Operation Protective Edge 
 
With regard to Operation Protective Edge, Israel did not immediately inform the Security 
Council of its actions, but waited until the Council met on 10 July 2014.135 At this meeting, 
																																																						
121 Isabel Kershner and Rick Gladstone, ‘Israel and Hamas Step Up Air Attacks in Gaza Clash’ The New York Times 
(15 November 2012) available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/16/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-
assault.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>. 
122 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kingdom of Bahrain), ‘Minister of State for Foreign Affairs affirms Bahrain’s 
position in supporting the Palestinian case’ (17 November 2012) available at 
<http://www.mofa.gov.bh/Default.aspx?tabid=7824&ItemId=2102> (which talked of ‘Israeli aggression’). 
123 Harriet Sherwood and Luke Harding, ‘Egyptian president condemns Israel’s “aggression” in Gaza’ The Guardian 
(15 November 2012) available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/15/egyptian-president-condemns-
israel-gaza> (which talked of Israel’s ‘aggression’). 
124 ‘Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Russia chorus condemnation of Israel’s resort to force, US leads Western supporters’, 
The Times of Israel (15 November 2012), available at <http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-jordan-turkey-and-
russia-chorus-condemnation-of-israels-resort-to-force-us-leads-western-supporters/>. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 ‘PM Raja Ashraf condemns Israeli air strikes’ PakTribune (17 November 2012) available at 
<http://paktribune.com/news/PM-Raja-Ashraf-condemns-Israeli-air-strikes-255019.html> (‘grave violation of 
international law’). 
128 ‘Saudi Arabia Condemns the Israeli Assaults on Gaza Strip’ Alridyah (18 November 2012) available at 
<http://sites.alriyadh.com/en/article/785392/Saudi-Arabia-Condemns-the-Israeli-Assaults-on-Gaza-Strip> (talks of 
the ‘new aggression’ committed by Israel).  
129 ‘Yemen strongly condemns brutal Israeli aggression on Gaza’ Yemen News Agency (SABA) (16 November 2012) 
available at <http://www.sabanews.net/en/news287944.htm> (talks of ‘aggression’). 
130 Amnesty International, ‘Israel/Gaza: All sides must step back from the brink to protect civilians’  (14 November 
2012) available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2012/11/israelgaza-all-sides-must-step-back-brink-
protect-civilians/>; Human Rights Watch, ‘Israel/Gaza: Avoid harm to civilians’  (15 November 2012) available at 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/15/israel/gaza-avoid-harm-civilians>. 
131 UNSC Verbatm Record (14 November 2012) UN Doc. S/PV.6863. 
132 UNSC Verbatim Record (21 November 2012) UN Doc. S/PV.6869,. 
133 Ibid, 2. 
134 Ibid., 3. 
135 UN Doc. S/PV.7214 (n 48). 
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Israel, while not specifically mentioning Article 51, or that it had been the subject of an ‘armed 
attack’, nevertheless stated: 
 
This week, Israel launched a self-defence operation, called Protective Edge, to counter the attacks, to 
defend our citizens and to secure for them a life without a constant threat. The goal of our operation is to 
remove the threat posed by Hamas by dismantling its military infrastructure and to restore calm in Israel. 
We are not looking for a band-aid solution that will allow Hamas to rest and regroup. We are not going to 
give them so-called time out so that they can replenish their rocket supplies and hit us again in a few 
weeks.136 
 
Israel furthermore argued that the use of force was justified by the fact that Israel ‘had no choice’ 
but to defend itself against what it called the ‘Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza’ that ‘is 
intentionally and indiscriminately threatening the lives of 3.5 million innocent men, women and 
children’ by its rockets and that ‘no nation, no people and no Government could tolerate it’.137 At 
a subsequent meeting of the Security Council, on 18 July 2014, Israel’s Ambassador Prosor 
stated that his country was ‘acting solely to defend Israelis from constant terror attacks.’138 
 
At the meeting of 10 July 2014, the Palestinian representative, Riyad Mansour, described the 
operation as Israeli ‘military aggression’.139 Furthermore, Mr Mansour stated that:  
 
We also reject the claims of self-defence by Israel, while, despite the prohibition under international law, it 
deliberately carries out reprisals and collective punishment against the Palestinian people in declared 
retaliation and revenge, directly called for by the Israeli Prime Minister himself, for the killing of three 
Israeli settlers, which the Palestinian leadership has clearly condemned.140 
 
Indeed, ‘[n]o act in self-defence can justify the killing of children or the oppression of the 
Palestinian people in the occupied territories.’141 Poignantly, the Palestinian representative also 
talked of Israel clearly violating its responsibility as an occupying Power to ensure the safety and 
well-being of the civilian population under its occupation.142  
 
During the meeting of 18 July 2014, Mr Mansour reiterated the view that the ‘savage Israeli 
aggression [could not] be justified by any means. It is not self-defence but a vengeful military 
aggression, intentionally planned and perpetrated by the occupying Power against the civilian 
population under its occupation.’143 It went on to stress that Israel had ‘cynically used the killing 
of three Israeli settlers to launch the aggression’ and called upon the Security Council to 
condemn Israel’s action/unlawful conduct?.144 
 
During the initial phases of Operation Protective Edge, the United States, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
came out in support of Israel, and was critical of Hamas. In particular, it stressed that ‘no country 
can accept rocket fire aimed at civilians’ and it supported ‘Israel’s right to defend itself against 
																																																						
136 Ibid., 6-7. 
137 Ibid., 6. 
138 UNSC Verbatim Record (18 July 2014) UN Doc. S/PV.7220. 
139 UN Doc. S/PV.7214 (n 48135) at 4. 
140 Ibid., 5. 
141 Ibid., 5. 
142UN Doc. S/PV. 7220 (n 138) 6. 
143  Ibid, 5. 
144 Ibid., 5-6. 
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these vicious attacks.’145 Israel’s ‘right to defend itself’ was also accepted by several European 
states.146 The EU, in urging restraint by both sides and displaying concern for the mounting 
civilian casualties, ‘recogniz[ed] Israel's legitimate right to defend itself against any attacks’ and 
‘underline[d] that the Israeli military operation must be proportionate and in line with 
international humanitarian law’.147 Ireland condemned the violence.148 A number of countries, 
including Venezuela, Egypt, Iran and Pakistan denounced the Israeli operation from both 
states.149 In a Communiqué, the Joint Coordination Committee of the Non- Aligned Movement 
and the Group of 77 and China, representing 135 states, ‘strongly condemn[ed] the ongoing 
military aggression by Israel’ and ‘demand[ed] an immediate end’.150 The Arab League 
Secretary-General, Nabil al Arabi, called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council to 
‘adopt measures to stop Israeli aggression against the Gaza Strip’.151 Secretary-General Ban Ki-
Moon urged restraint on both sides and expressed concern over the civilian casualties.152 On 23 
July 2014, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry to investigate all 
violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law during Operation 
Protective Edge which published its report on 24 June 2015.153 As with the Goldstone Report, 
published in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, the report on Operation Protective Edge 
similarly excluded analysis of the jus ad bellum issues that arose. 
 
During the meeting of the UNSC on 18 July, Jordan strongly condemned ‘the repeated 
																																																						
145 Josh Earnest, White House Press Secretary, Daily Briefing (8 July 2014) available at 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=105420> 
146 See, for example, the UK: UK Prime Minister’s Office, ‘PM Call with Israeli Prime Minister’ (9 July 2014) 
available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-call-with-israeli-prime-minister>; Germany: Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, Foreign Minister of Germany, Statement on the Situation in the Middle East (8 July 2014) available at 
<www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2014/140708-BM_Nahost.html?nn=582300>. 
147 European Union External Action Service, Statement by the Spokesperson on Rocket Fire from Gaza and On-
Going Retaliation Operations of the Israeli Defence Force (Brussels, 8 July 2014) Doc 140708/02 available at 
<http://eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_15236_en.htm>. 
148 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Minister Gilmore condemns violence in Gaza and Israel’(9 July 
2014) available at <www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-archive/2014/july/minister-gilmore-
condemns-violence-gaza-israel/>. 
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<www.embavenez.by/en/news/1467-venezuela-condena-nueva-agresion-contra-palestina>; Egyptian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, ‘Egypt condemns Israeli hostilities against the Gaza Strip’ (9 July 2014) available at 
<www.mfa.gov.eg/English/Ministry/News/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?Source=6781921f-3993-444a-859e-
ee26ce851de8&newsID=45b91d39-d1bd-438a-934d-a6d036fb94b8>; ‘Iran urges firm action on brutal Israel 
attacks’, Presstv (9 July 2014,) available at <www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/07/09/370533/iran-urges-firm-action-on-
israel-raids/>; Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pakistan condemns Israeli military attacks on Gaza’ (9 July 
2014) available at <www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?prID=2083>.  
150	Communiqué of the Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) of the Non- Aligned Movement and 
the Group of 77 and China calling for an end to the Israeli military Aggression against the 
Palestinian people, particularly in the Gaza Strip, 28 July 2014, 29 July 2014, available at <	
http://english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=frrm4qa24792213897afrrm4q>.	
151 See ‘World reacts to the conflict in Gaza’ Al Jazeera (10 July 2014) 
<www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/world-reacts-conflict-gaza-201471073217736666.html>.  
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aggressions waged by Israel on the Gaza Strip’.154 However, several Council members, including 
the United States, Nigeria, Lithuania, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Rwanda, explicitly 
recognized the right of Israel ‘to defend itself’ or ‘to protect its population’ from rocket fire, 
although did not refer to Article 51 UN Charter.155 In addition, many members of the Council 
stressed that Israel should act proportionately and ensure the protection of civilians at all 
times,156 while a number of countries, such as Chile and Argentina, argued that Israel had 
escalated the conflict and/or had engaged in disproportionate and excessive use of force.157 In a 
similar vein, several Members explicitly held the civilian toll on the Palestinian side to be 
unjustifiable.158 Other States, such as China and the Republic of Korea, expressed concern over 
the high number of civilian casualties.159  
 
The debate within the Security Council on 22 July 2014 was generally more negative towards 
Israel. Several States, for example the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Nigeria, 
Chad, as well as the European Union,160 still supported, as a matter of principle, Israel’s right to 
act in self-defence, although without referring to Article 51 UN Charter.161 At the other end of 
the spectrum, many countries, for example Pakistan, Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, Indonesia and 
Bangladesh, described the Israeli operation as an act of ‘aggression’,162 a sentiment shared by the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.163 A recurring criticism of the operation by Members of 
the Council was that it represented a form of ‘collective punishment’ against the people of 
Gaza.164 However, numerous States took the opportunity to again stress that Israel must act in a 
proportionate manner in exercising its right of self-defence and in line with international 
humanitarian law, as well as taking all the necessary measures to prevent or minimize civilian 
casualties.165 Indeed, while many States clearly condemned Hamas’ indiscriminate firing of 
rockets into Israel, it was also apparent within the meeting that most States were critical of 
Israel’s disproportionate and excessive use of force against the civilian population of Gaza.166 
Some States expressly denied the legality of Israel’s self-defence claim upon the basis of 
considerations of proportionality.167 For example, El Salvador stressed that ‘the exercise of 
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156 Ibid., 12 (Nigeria), 14 (Lithuania), 15 (United Kingdom), 17 (Luxembourg), 20 (Rwanda). 
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States’ right to legitimate self-defence, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, does not 
justify the disproportionate use of military force against another State, and even less against its 
civilian population’.168  
 
Following on from the tone of the meeting of 22 July, it was clear that the international 
condemnation of Israel grew, especially in light of a number of Israeli attacks which resulted in  
large numbers of civilian casualties, as well as several attacks against UN facilities, such as a UN 
school in Rafa.169 
III. Legality of the operations 
 
Despite their controversy and devastating consequences, the three Israeli interventions into Gaza 
attracted relatively little attention in legal doctrine.170 In a letter published in The Sunday Times 
over two dozen international lawyers rejected Israel’s justification of self-defence. Instead, it was 
argued, Israel’s actions amounted to ‘aggression’: 
 
ISRAEL has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that it amounts to an act of “self-
defence” as recognised by Article 51, United Nations Charter. We categorically reject this contention … 
The rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they are, do not, in terms of scale and effect amount to 
an armed attack, entitling Israel to rely on self-defence. Under international law self-defence is an act of 
last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity … Israel’s actions amount 
to aggression, not self-defence, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary … We condemn the 
firing of rockets by Hamas into Israel and suicide bombings which are also contrary to international 
humanitarian law and are war crimes. Israel has a right to take reasonable and proportionate means to 
protect its civilian population from such attacks. However, the manner and scale of its operations in Gaza 
amount to an act of aggression and is contrary to international law, notwithstanding the rocket attacks by 
Hamas.171 
 
It is worth recalling that Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
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necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
The right of self-defence as contained in Article 51 comprises both procedural and substantive 
elements. On a procedural level, it is clear from the accounts elaborated within the above section 
that Israel generally satisfied the requirement of reporting its actions to the UN Security 
Council.172 This section, however, will focus more on the substantive requirements of self-
defence contained within Article 51 and in customary international law. While the letter above 
appeared to focus to a large degree on the necessity and proportionality of Israel’s response – 
two requirements for self-defence found within customary international law and addressed below 
– it also argued that the rockets fired from Hamas did not constitute an armed attack, the sina 
qua non for the invocation of the right of self-defence under Article 51. As eluded to by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Wall advisory opinion, for the purposes of the right of 
self-defence an armed attack must be directed from outside of a State’s own territory or or 
territory occupied or controlled by it:  
 
The Court … notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel 
itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not 
outside, that territory … Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance 
in this case.173 
 
The general point was reaffirmed in the Chatham House Principles, stating that ‘unless an attack 
is directed from outside territory under the control of the defending State, the question of self-
defence in the sense of Article 51 does not normally arise’.174 Consequently, if Gaza was ‘under 
the control’ of Israel and the IDF at the time of the interventions then self-defence is excluded ab 
initio. 
 
Although occupied by Israel since 1967, Israel, as noted above, went through a so-called 
‘unilateral disengagement’ from Gaza in 2005, raising the prospect of the territory being seen as 
sufficiently separate from Israel to enable it be the instigator of an armed attack. For example, 
the UN Secretary General’s Palmer Report on the Israeli flotilla raid in 2010 found that the 
international law of blockade was applicable based upon the fact that ‘Gaza and Israel are both 
distinct territorial and political areas’.175 Yet, it is also widely believed that Israel was continuing 
to occupy the Gaza Strip during all three of the interventions. Indeed, despite the 2005 
proclaimed disengagement, whereby Israeli civilians and IDF troops were removed from the 
Gaza Strip, the consensus appears to be that Gaza remained occupied territory under 
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international law.176 Indeed, this view is shared, inter alia, by many States speaking within the 
UN Security Council during the discussions on the interventions,177 the UN Secretary General,178 
and the Goldstone Report.179 This is based upon the fact that Gaza was subjected to a 
comprehensive economic and political blockade, and Israel controlled all of the territory’s entry 
and exit points, its airspace, its territorial waters, its local monetary market, and population 
registry. It would, in this sense, be seen to have effective control of Gaza; therefore as  Gaza was 
‘under the control of the defending State’ at the time of the interventions,180 the international 
right of self-defence was arguably not applicable.  
 
Nonetheless, while Israel exerted a large degree of control over the external aspects of Gaza’s 
existence it was not, however, permanently present on the ground within Gaza and did not 
exercise control over the actions of the political actors within Gaza or over the other groups 
operating there. While Israel exerted a large degree of control over Gaza, the two could 
legitimately be seen to be ‘distinct territorial and political areas’.181 Furthermore, during the 
debates over the three interventions very few States denied that Israel’s right of self-defence 
existed in principle. As such, the possibility of Israel invoking its right of self-defence should not 
be dismissed too readily. 
 
The first issue, then, and going back to the textual provision of Article 51, is whether Hamas and 
the other non-State groups operating within Gaza are able to perpetrate an armed attack. On the 
one hand, given that it can be seen to exist as an independent territorial and political unit it might 
be seen to constitute, or form part of, a ‘contested State’ of Palestine.182 According to this view, 
there is arguably no problem with the notion of it being responsible for an armed attack, although 
while Hamas would be seen as the governmental authorities within this contested State, or the 
relevant part thereof, questions remain in regards to the other non-State groups operating within 
Gaza, and in particular the responsibility of Hamas for the actions of these groups. 
However, another opinion is that Hamas and the other groups operating from Gaza are simply 
non-State actors, which raises potential question marks over their ability to be the perpetrators of 
an armed attack. Academic opinion is to an extent divided on this issue. Some scholars have 
maintained the view that the right of self-defence only exists in light of an attack by a State 
actor.183 Furthermore, while different interpretations have been put to it, the ICJ nonetheless 
stated in the Wall advisory opinion that ‘Article 51 of the Charter … recognizes the existence of 
																																																						
176 Scobbie (n 1) 293. This raises the prospect of the laws of belligerent occupation, as a section of the law of armed 
conflict, becoming applicable, an issue that was prominent within the debates at the UN. See section 2 above.  
177 See, in general, section 2 above. 
178 S/PV.6060 (n 19) 4. 
179 The Goldstone Report (n 7) paras [276]-[277]. 
180 Wilmshurst (n 174) 
181 Palmer Report (n.152). Report of the independent commission of inquiry? (n 153) 
182 See Christian Henderson, ‘Contested States and the Rights and Obligations of the Jus ad Bellum’ (2013) 21 
Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 367. 
183 See, for example, Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘Changing Jus Cogens through State Practice? The Case of the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force and its Exceptions’ in Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force 
in International Law (OUP 2015) 157, 171-3. 
	 18	
an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. 
However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.’184  
In this respect, pages have been written on whether attribution to a State is required, as might be 
seen in the Nicaragua case.185 However, it is perhaps fair to say that many of States and scholars, 
today, perceive non-State actors as being qualified in their own right to perpetrate an armed 
attack under international law.186 Indeed, there is nothing in Article 51 restricting invocation of 
the right to attacks by State actors only,187 and the infamous Caroline case, which has been 
described as the ‘locus classicus’ of self-defence,188 was itself an example of an action in self-
defence against the activities of non-State actors. Today, the view that non-State actors are able 
to perpetrate an armed attack for the purposes of the right of self-defence arguably stems from 
the invocation of the right of self-defence by the United States following the attacks of 11 
September 2001.189 Not only was the right consciously invoked in the face of attacks by the non-
State terrorist group al-Qaida, but this appeared to be not only tolerated but widely accepted 
within the international community, with very few dissenting voices.190 One interpretation of this 
reaction is that it entailed recognition that, due to the scale of the 9/11 attacks, non-State actors 
were able and willing to use force that appeared to be akin to the scale of that used by States, 
employing weapons with similar destructive capability, and being able to perpetrate attacks with 
similarly dire effects in terms of death and destruction. If a State is subjected to such a horrific 
attack, why should it make any difference, in principle, if it was perpetrated by a State or a non-
State actor, as the State in question still needs to defend itself, which is the raison d’être of the 
right encompassed in UN Charter Article 51?  
It was the ICJ in the Nicaragua judgment that first raised the notion of armed attacks being of a 
particular ‘scale and effects’ and of a certain gravity.191 While some have dismissed this so-
called gravity threshold in the case of attacks by States,192 it is something that appears to have 
been maintained in the case of attacks by non-State actors.193 Furthermore, the ICJ made the 
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distinction between armed attacks and ‘mere frontier incidents’,194 which is perhaps what the 
rocket attacks from Gaza could be perceived as. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission also 
excluded ‘border encounters’ from the purview of armed attack when it stated that ‘[l]ocalized 
border encounters between small infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not 
constitute an armed attack for the purposes of the Charter.’195 The Commission, as such, 
concluded that the clashes were ‘relatively minor incidents … not of a magnitude to constitute an 
armed attack by either State against the other within the meaning of Article 51 of the UN 
Charter’,196 although this was, of course, in the context of a conflict between two States. In this 
light, it is difficult to conclude that the rocket attacks constituted an armed attack, thus permitting 
Israel to invoke its right of self-defence. 
 
However, others have dismissed such a gravity threshold. Indeed, an alternative view is that 
rather than seeing armed attacks that give rise to the right of self-defence as 
quantitatively/qualitatively different from mere uses of force, which do not give rise to this right, 
the legality of the action in self-defence could be judged upon the basis of the proportionality of 
the response and not on the basis of not the magnitude of the forcible act provoking it.197. If we 
apply this test to the operations studied in this chapter it is difficult to reach a positive verdict. 
Indeed, the proportionality of the response of Israel seemed to be the main sticking point even 
for those States that supported the State’s right of self-defence in principle.198  
 
Yet, Israel appears to have implicitly argued that the rocket attacks should not be seen in 
isolation but should, instead, be assessed cumulatively. Indeed, in quantifying the stream of 
rocket attacks for the purposes of determining whether an armed attack has occurred or is 
occurring, the ‘accumulation of events’ theory might provide some support to Israel’s invocation 
of the right of self-defence.199 It is true that this theory has been given some implicit support by, 
for example, the ICJ200 as well as in the writing of scholars.201 Nevertheless, even if we could 
envisage the threshold of an armed attack as one that could be crossed through an accumulation 
of smaller, more minor, attacks it is difficult to see the rocket attacks as doing so. Indeed, even 
taken cumulatively, the scale of the effects of the rocket attacks arguably did not reach that 
threshold, as appears to be asserted in the letter to the Sunday Times above. Perhaps it would 
depend upon whether we judge the ‘scale and effects’ of the rockets by their actual effects or 
potential effects. The actual effects of the rockets landing in Israel was, as the letter above 
indicates and as was asserted by many during the debates within the Security Council, relatively 
minimal. On the other hand, the potential effects of such rocket attacks, and the constant fear of 
attack, is far greater, and the effects would have been greater if it were not for Israel’s Iron Dome 
missile defence system.  
 
It is possible to argue that Israel was entitled to rely on a more prospective interpretation of the 
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right of self-defence, in the form of the right of anticipatory self-defence. This might seem to be 
evident in its stated aims of actively fighting terrorists and protecting Israeli citizens from further 
attacks. This right, which is normally based upon demonstrating that a threat of ‘imminent’ 
attack exists, would be easier to demonstrate given the cycle of constant attacks and constant 
threat of attack. Yet, it can be argued that given this context and having already suffered an 
attack, either singularly or cumulatively, there is no need to rely on anticipatory self-defence as 
the action falls squarely within the concept of self-defence as found within Article 51, regardless 
of the prospective defensive aim of the operations. 
 
In addition to the question as to whether it is possible to view the rocket attacks as an armed 
attack, there are, as noted above, two further associated elements in the legal assessment of the 
operations: the necessity and proportionality of any action taken in self-defence. While in the 
legal assessment of actions in self-defence the ICJ has perceived these criterion as somewhat 
secondary considerations to that of whether an armed attack has occurred,202 they play a more 
central role in the assessments undertaken by States.203 Indeed, throughout the course of the 
debates not a single State mentioned the phrase ‘armed attack’ but States constantly discussed 
whether the Israeli operations were necessary and proportionate. As such, even if we are to 
conclude that Israel was not the victim of an ‘armed attack’ on one or all of the occasions, the 
question of whether the interventions were necessary and proportionate cannot be simply 
dismissed. Indeed, given the disagreement that exists within legal doctrine as to what constitutes 
an ‘armed attack’ it would be remiss to do so. 
 
Necessity is often referenced back to the Caroline case correspondence of 1841 between the 
British and the Americans in which a ‘necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’ was required.204 This has been interpreted 
in more recent times to mean that, in the absence of an immediate necessity to respond, all 
reasonable alternatives of defending the State must have been exhausted and/or that there is a 
demonstrable futility in invoking available non-forcible measures.205 In this respect, it might be 
argued that prior to invoking its right of self-defence, Israel should have brought the rocket 
attacks to the attention of the UN Security Council. However, it did just that on numerous 
occasions,206 meaning that Israel may have been justified in claiming that the Council did not 
take the ‘necessary measures’ (per Article 51 of the UN Charter) which would have precluded, in 
principle, Israel invoking its right of self-defence. As such, given that the UN Security Council 
did not take action, and given the constant threat that Israel claimed it was under, it might be 
argued that Israel’s action in self-defence was necessary. 
 
However, a further alternative to military action was presented in the form of the various 
ceasefires that had been agreed upon, that not only were in existence but had been shown to be 
successful for both parties to the dispute. Indeed, it has been argued, in connection with 
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Operation Cast Lead, that: 
 
The figures strongly demonstrate that Israel diminished rocket attacks and mortar shellings in a matter of 
weeks through diplomatic means. Israel was able to bring more protection to its citizens during the four 
months when it agreed to a ceasefire than it was able to provide in all the months preceding and in the 
month following the ceasefire when it had used force … In addition to diminishing the rocket and mortar 
attacks, Israel was also able to forge a mutual interest with Hamas. Despite the ceasefire, Hamas not only 
ceased its attacks on Israel but it worked to prohibit other groups from launching attacks as well.207 
 
Based on this account it might be argued that Israel itself had created the necessity for the action 
in self-defence. Indeed ‘Israel justified its attack on Gaza as a response to Hamas rocket fire into 
Israel in violation of the ceasefire. While Hamas indeed renewed its cross-border attacks leading 
up to Operation Cast Lead, it did so in response to an Israeli raid into Gaza that killed six Hamas 
militants on November 4, 2008, four months into the tenuous ceasefire.’208 Furthermore, in 
feeding into the discussion on necessity, and in light of Israel’s stated aims in regards/with regard 
to the operations of putting an end to the rocket attacks once and for all, the repeated nature of 
the interventions arguably leads one to conclude that they were clearly ineffective and therefore 
unnecessary. For example, during Operation Cast Lead Israeli Ambassador Shalev clearly stated 
that the aim of the operation was ‘ensuring the end of terrorism from Gaza’.209 Yet, five years 
later in the third of the major operations discussed here, Operation Protective Edge, Ambassador 
Shalev, in somewhat similar tones, stated that ‘[t]he goal of our operation is to remove the threat 
posed by Hamas’ and that Israel was not looking for a ‘band-aid’ solution.210 In this sense, given 
that Cast Lead had failed in its key objective there was no reason to believe that a similar 
military operation with similar objectives in the future would succeed.  
 
In this respect, one might claim that despite the stated aims of the operations, their real aim was 
not of a defensive nature, but instead of a punitive nature, to punish Hamas and the other groups 
involved in the rocket attacks. Many will claim that the operations were simply armed reprisals, 
which are outlawed under international law.211 Of course, Israel was careful not to justify its 
actions in this way, and States generally did not characterize Israel’s actions in this way, with 
most either accepting the right of self-defence in principle or claiming that the Israel’s 
interventions were aggression.212 
 
However, if the rocket attacks emanating from Gaza had not crossed the ‘legal rubicon’,213 
individually or cumulatively, and if Israel’s interventions did not satisfy the necessity criterion 
and/or were seen as acts of reprisal, the question arises as to whether Israel was responsible for 
an act of aggression,214 which was, as noted above, a prominent accusation amongst States who 
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condemned the Israeli interventions.215 Aggression is stated in the 1974 Definition of Aggression 
as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations’.216 Given what was said above in regards to Israel being perceived as the 
occupying State, the question arises as to whether aggression can take place by an occupier 
against a territory that is subject to belligerent occupation. The Definition of Aggression 
arguably applies in these contexts. Indeed, if Article 1 is read in conjunction with its explanatory 
note which states that ‘In this Definition the term “State”: (a) Is used without prejudice to 
questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United Nations’ it would seem 
to apply.217 Indeed, ‘[t]he reason why the word “state” was retained in Article 1 of the Definition 
was to ensure conformity with the language used in the UN Charter’,218 and allegations of 
aggression have been similarly made in the context of attacks against entities whose statehood 
was questionable or contested, for example South Korea, Goa, East Timor, and the Falkland 
Islands. As such, ‘the legal status of the territory subjected to an act of aggression is not a 
significant factor in making a determination as to whether such an act in fact occurred’.219  
 
However, States accusing Israel of aggression did not often appear to do so upon the basis that 
Israel had no right to use force in the first place, either because of a lack of an armed attack or 
necessity for an armed response, but more because of the disproportionate nature of its eventual 
response.220 While proportionality might arguably require a defending State to scale its forcible 
response to the attack preceding it,221 the more generally accepted interpretation of this 
customary requirement is that the response in self-defence must be proportionate in relation to 
the aim of the defensive action.222 In this respect, proportionality might be seen as possessing 
two inter-related limbs; whether a use of force was a proportionate response given the nature of 
the preceding attack (which is closely related to necessity) and then whether the operation as a 
whole was proportionate in halting the attack or imminent threat of one. In respect to the first of 
these, given the persistent and cumulative nature of the rocket attacks we might view 
proportionality in light of Israel’s stated aims of putting an end once and for all to the rocket 
attacks. Yet, given the failure of the past interventions, it is arguable that it was a 
disproportionate response,.  This failure and the amount of civilian deaths and destruction  leads 
to the conclusion that the operations were disproportionate. Indeed, whether we gauge the 
legality of the operations upon the basis of responding to the preceding rockets taken singly or 
cumulatively, or upon Israel’s stated aim of ending terrorism from Gaza, it is difficult to perceive 
them as either necessary or proportionate. 
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IV. Conclusion: precedential value 
 
The unfortunate reality is that the three Israeli interventions will be perceived by many as 
‘business as usual’. In this respect, there is a sense that with every intervention Israel fails to 
learn the lessons of the past, perhaps including that they will not put an end to rocket attacks 
emanating from Gaza. Given that this was the stated aim of Israel on each occasion, it is difficult 
to see them as necessary. Nonetheless, concessions on either side are not something that have 
been witnessed too frequently in the Middle East crisis, and without them it is difficult to see an 
alternative future to the circular pattern of rocket attacks and interventions. When both claim, 
with regular support, that the other is responsible for aggression, or the instigator of violence, the 
law on the use of force can seem either irrelevant or, at best, trapped. 
 
This notwithstanding, it is more in connection with the related questions of whether the rocket 
attacks constituted an armed attack and whether Israel’s response was proportionate that are 
perhaps of most interest to the international lawyer, and where we may find its  most relevant 
precedential value. While some supported Israel’s claim of self-defence, and against what many 
will see as non-State actors, there was little express renunciation of it in principle. In this respect, 
the reaction to the interventions arguably provide further support for the argument that armed 
attacks may be perpetrated by non-State actors. Furthermore, given that the right was invoked in 
the face of numerous rocket attacks, which arguably taken individually would not amount to an 
armed attack, there is perhaps some implicit support in principle from these interventions for the 
‘accumulation of events’ theory. Lastly, it is unclear whether the States who charged Israel with 
aggression were doing so in the context of the legal form of the phrase, but there is also support 
to be taken from these interventions for the proposition that aggression can occur against non-
State actors, and even within territory under the control of the defending State. 
 
